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Abstract—The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
protocol is the IETF standard for securing the Internet of
Things. The Constrained Application Protocol, ZigBee IP, and
Lightweight Machine-to-Machine (LWM2M) mandate its use
for securing application traffic. There has been much debate
in both the standardization and research communities on the
applicability of DTLS to constrained environments. The main
concerns are the communication overhead and latency of the
DTLS handshake, and the memory footprint of a DTLS imple-
mentation. This paper provides a thorough performance evalu-
ation of DTLS in different duty-cycled networks through real-
world experimentation, emulation and analysis. In particular,
we measure the duration of the DTLS handshake when using
three duty cycling link-layer protocols: preamble-sampling, the
IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled mode and the IEEE 802.15.4e
Time Slotted Channel Hopping mode. The reported results
demonstrate surprisingly poor performance of DTLS in radio
duty-cycled networks. Because a DTLS client and a server
exchange more than 10 signaling packets, the DTLS handshake
takes between a handful of seconds and several tens of seconds,
with similar results for different duty cycling protocols. Moreover,
because of their limited memory, typical constrained nodes can
only maintain 3-5 simultaneous DTLS sessions, which highlights
the need for using DTLS parsimoniously.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and its successor Transport
Layer Security (TLS) [1] are fundamental cryptographic proto-
cols supporting secure communication over the Internet. With
the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) and its applications,
we face the problem of supporting communication security
for IoT devices that present stringent energy, memory, and
CPU constraints. Datagram TLS (DTLS) [2] is a version of
TLS running over UDP used by the Constrained Application
Protocol (CoAP) [3], ZigBee IP and Lightweight Machine
to Machine (LWM2M) (other standards for constrained IoT
networks) to secure IoT application traffic.
Yet, running DTLS on constrained IoT devices is challeng-
ing, in particular because of the amount of traffic needed to
establish a DTLS session and of the memory footprint of a
DTLS implementation [4], [5]. DTLS benchmarks exist [6],
[7] and focus on memory footprint and message size for
different cipher suites.
To achieve long lifetimes up to several years on a battery,
IoT devices use duty cycling link-layer protocols—they follow
a sleep/wakeup schedule to minimize the time their radio
transceivers are on, which reduces the energy consumption.
Client Server
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Fig. 1. Message exchange during a DTLS handshake. Messages in paren-
theses are not sent for pre-shared key cipher suites.
On the other hand, duty cycling results in higher latency and
lower throughput, which has a direct impact on the DTLS
performance. The goal of this paper is to provide a thorough
evaluation of the DTLS performance on top of representative
duty-cycled networks. More specifically, the contributions of
this paper are the following:
• We measure the duration of the DTLS handshake and
energy consumption for the following three duty cycling
protocols: preamble sampling [8], IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-
enabled mode [9], and IEEE 802.15.4e Time Slotted
Channel Hopping (TSCH) [10]. We use several evalu-
ation methods (emulation, measurements on a real-world
testbed, an analysis) to obtain meaningful results. This
part is the core of the paper.
• We quantify the impact of the limited memory on the
number of simultaneous DTLS sessions a constrained IoT
device can maintain.
• We show that the probability for a DTLS session estab-
lishment to fail because the server runs out of memory to
hold the associated state can be modeled with the Engset
loss formula.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II gives an overview of the DTLS protocol. Sec-
tions III-A, III-B and III-C present the experimental and
analytical performance results of DTLS on top of duty cy-
cling protocols. Section IV discusses the impact of memory
constraints on DTLS. Section V presents related work and
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. OVERVIEW OF DTLS
Securing application traffic is often achieved by transferring
data over a secure channel between the two communicating
end-points. In the network stack, this secure end-to-end chan-
nel can be established at the network layer (e.g. IPsec), the
transport layer (e.g. TLS), or the application layer (e.g. SSH).
For application development, security at the Transport layer
is the most common. The de-facto security standard for the
Internet application traffic is Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and
its IETF successor Transport Layer Security (TLS) [1]. TLS
was designed for client-server applications that operate over a
reliable transport. To establish a secure channel, a client and
a server first perform the TLS handshake during which they
authenticate each other and derive the symmetric keys to use
during the session.
DTLS [2] is an extension of TLS for datagram transport and
runs over UDP rather than TCP. Like TLS, DTLS protects the
payload with encryption and authentication. DTLS records are
8 bytes longer than in TLS, as DTLS adds an explicit 8-byte
sequence number. Stream ciphers, such as RC4, create an inter-
record cryptographic context that introduces vulnerabilities
with dropped and reordered packets. Consequently, DTLS bans
the use of stream ciphers and relies on block ciphers for
encrypting and authenticating records.
All messages carried by DTLS are encapsulated within
DTLS records that add a constant 13 byte overhead per data-
gram. The Record Layer supports four DTLS upper protocols:
1) Handshake protocol establishing a secure authenticated
session between two peers, negotiating algorithms, and the
key material; 2) Alert protocol signaling session closure or
eventual errors; 3) Change Cipher Spec protocol signaling
modifications to encryption strategies; and 4) Application Data
protocol carrying application data. To deal with Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks, the Handshake protocol uses a stateless
cookie exchange: before the server allocates any resources, the
client needs to resends the cookie thus proving that the client
can receive messages at a given IP address.
Fig. 1 shows a message exchange during a DTLS hand-
shake. Once the client has replayed the stateless cookie from
the server HelloVerifyRequest message, the server al-
locates the necessary resources. It chooses its preferred cipher
from the client cipher set and notifies the client using a
ServerHello message. The messages exchanged during
key negotiation depend on the cipher. When using a pre-shared
key, the message containing the server certificate is omitted
and the server optionally sends ServerKeyExchange indi-
cating to the client which pre-shared key to use. In this case,
the two parties authenticate each other with the common secret
(also used to derive the session keys).
Because of different application types, DTLS has been used
differently in IoT networks and on the traditional Internet. It
is very common for a regular Internet host to establish short-
lived TLS sessions, for example when browsing the Internet
https URLs. An IoT device typically periodically reports
sensor readings to a server and therefore uses one long-lived
DTLS session, which is a good thing as constrained IoT
networks cannot handle frequent expensive DTLS handshakes,
as highlighted in this paper. However, we are witnessing the
emergence of applications in which mobile workers establish
short-lived DTLS sessions with individual nodes using hand-
held devices, for example for maintenance or drive-by me-
tering [11]. In this context, it is important to understand the
limitations of DTLS when duty cycling protocols are used.
Duty cycling is a cornerstone technique for achieving
long lifetimes of IoT devices. A typical IoT node with an
IEEE 802.15.4 radio will deplete a 2200mAh AA battery
in about a week, if the radio is left on continuously (ei-
ther receiving or transmitting). State-of-the-art duty cycling
protocols reduce the radio duty cycle below 1%, thereby
extending the device lifetime to several years. The price of
such aggressive duty cycling is an increased network delay and
reduced throughput. In the following sections, we study the
effects of duty cycling protocols on the performance of DTLS
through emulation, real-world experimentation, and analysis.
III. DTLS PERFORMANCE IN DUTY-CYCLED NETWORKS
A. Preamble Sampling Protocols
To reduce radio idle listening, nodes in preamble sampling
protocols periodically wake up to check the state of the
wireless medium. The period at which a node wakes up is
called the “Check Interval” (CI); the lower the CI, the more
often nodes check the medium, and the higher their idle
radio duty-cycle. Before sending a data packet, the transmitter
repeatedly transmits a special control frame (called strobe)
for at least the CI. If the receiver receives such a frame when
checking the medium, it leaves its radio on until it receives the
data frame. In this section, we use X-MAC [8], [12], arguably
the most popular preamble sampling MAC protocol. X-MAC
adds the receiver address in each strobe, so only the destination
keeps its radio on to receive the data. All nodes (client, server
and relay nodes) use the same CI value.
We leverage tinyDTLS1, an open-source DTLS implemen-
tation and its port to the Contiki operating system [13].
We use a pre-shared key cipher suite of DTLS with AES
operating in CCM mode with 8-byte long authentication
tags (TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8). We evaluate the
performance of this implementation by emulation, using the
instruction-level MSP430 emulator MSPSim, and the Con-
tiki Cooja simulator [14]. We emulate WiSMote, a popular
constrained IoT platform featuring a 16-bit MSP430 micro-
controller with 16 kB of RAM running at 12MHz, and the
1 http://tinydtls.sourceforge.net/
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Fig. 2. Cost of a DTLS handshake in preamble sampling protocols.
IEEE 802.15.4-compliant CC2520 radio. The binary file used
for emulation runs on WiSMote hardware.
In the Cooja simulator, we create a linear network of 2
to 5 nodes, depending on the required number of hops. The
DTLS client (on one end of the linear network) repeatedly
performs the handshake with the DTLS server (on the other
end). There is no other traffic in the network. We estimate the
energy consumption using Energest, a Contiki per-component
profiling tool that measures the consumption of both the micro-
controller and radio. We average the results over 1000 DTLS
handshakes and present with a 95% confidence interval.
Overall results. Fig. 2 shows the measured average hand-
shake duration and the energy consumption when DTLS runs
on preamble sampling protocols, in the single/multi-hop case,
and for different values of CI and link PDR2. The energy
consumption in Fig. 2(c) is that of the DTLS client (running at
2.8V), during the DTLS handshake. Although absolute energy
values are specific to WiSMote, this platform is representative
of hardware commonly deployed today, and the trends in
Fig. 2(c) apply to all platforms. Overall, a DTLS handshake
takes 1–50 s, with an energy consumption in 10–200mJ range.
Impact of CI. At PDR=100%, the DTLS handshake dura-
tion and energy consumption grows linearly with CI. This is
expected, as a larger CI reduces the rate at which nodes can
exchange packets (hence a longer duration).
Impact of the number of hops. Similarly, separating DTLS
server and client by additional hops increases the duration
of the handshake. For PDR=100%, the increase is linear
(some retransmissions still occur due to the hidden terminal
problem); for PDR<100%, the increase is faster as a packet
can be lost on each of the hops.
Impact of PDR. In any wireless environment, external
interference and multi-path fading cause the PDR to be below
100%. When a DTLS message is lost, a timeout event occurs
at the DTLS layer, which triggers retransmission of DTLS
messages. X-MAC implicitly recovers from lost strobes, but
does not detect failed receptions of data frames as there are no
2Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) of a link is the percentage of frames
successfully received at the receiver node. We use the same PDR for all
links in the emulated network and control its level through the UDG radio
model of Cooja.
link-layer acknowledgements. This means that, when a DTLS
packet is lost, the DTLS implementation waits for 2 s (the
default tinyDTLS timeout value) before resending, causing a
longer latency. Dropping the PDR from 100% to 90% roughly
triples the handshake duration (Fig. 2(a)) and doubles the
energy (Fig. 2(c)).
Energy Consumption. Fig. 2(c) shows how a DTLS hand-
shake consumes more energy with a larger wakeup interval
(longer sleep periods): increasing CI requires a transmitter
to send a longer preamble. At PDR=100%, this increase is
linear. To put this energy into perspective, a DTLS handshake
cost of 29.05mJ (CI =500ms, PDR=100%) represents a
consumption 5 orders of magnitude lower than the energy
available in a pair of AA batteries. A single DTLS handshake
has hence a negligible effect on the constrained node lifetime.
The cost of completing a single DTLS handshake might
be more prohibitive for energy harvesting nodes with small
rechargeable batteries, For example, ST GreenNet [15] nodes
have a 20mAh battery, or 201.6 J at 2.8V. In this context,
a single 29.05mJ handshake accounts for 0.0144% of the
maximum available energy.
Packet overhead. Once the DTLS session has been es-
tablished, DTLS with AES CCM 8 cipher adds 29 bytes
to each datagram (including an 8-byte nonce and 8-byte
authentication tag), which represents 22.8% of the available
link-layer payload space (127 bytes). For the details on byte
overhead and possible optimizations, see Raza et al. [7].
B. Beacon-Enabled IEEE 802.15.4 Networks
Nodes in a beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 network are
organized as a cluster tree: some nodes are cluster heads (or
coordinators), others are leaf nodes. Cluster heads periodically
send beacon frames. A beacon frame indicates the start of
a Contention Active Period (CAP), during which leaf nodes
associated with the emitting cluster head communicate using
CSMA/CA medium access. After the CAP, and before the
next beacon, all nodes switch their radio off. Because beacons
are sent periodically, leaf nodes know when to wake up for
the next CAP. The beacon interval (BI) and the duration of
the CAP (CAP) are tunable, allowing a trade-off between the
amount of data that can be exchanged, and the radio duty
cycle.
In our experiments, the DTLS client runs on a leaf node. In
the single-hop case, the DTLS server runs on the cluster tree
root, otherwise as a leaf node associated with the cluster tree
root. We force a desired topology by tuning the parameters that
specify the maximum number of associated cluster heads/leaf
nodes such that the association requests are rejected until we
obtain the desired topology. That is, we chain intermediate
cluster head nodes between the DTLS client and the cluster
tree root to obtain a linear network from 2 to 5 nodes,
depending on the required number of hops. These cluster heads
do not generate any application traffic; they only transmit
periodic beacons and forward packets exchanged between
DTLS server, associated with the cluster tree root, and the
client.
We implement this protocol on a ST GreenNet node [15],
an energy harvesting prototype from STMicroelectronics
(ST) based on an ultra low power 32-bit ARM Cortex-
M3 micro-controller (STM32L) with 32 kB of RAM and
an IEEE 802.15.4-compliant radio transceiver. On top of the
IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled mode, the ST GreenNet nodes
run an enhanced Contiki IPv6/6LoWPAN stack optimized for
ultra low power consumption, suitable for energy harvesting
nodes [15]. We port the tinyDTLS implementation to this stack
and modify it to use an AES hardware acceleration block
available within the micro-controller. We run tinyDTLS with
exactly the same configuration as in Section III-A and estimate
the energy consumption using Energest that measures the time
spent by different components of the platform in a given state
(for instance, the time CPU spent in active or low power mode;
radio transceiver in RX or TX mode). We then derive energy
by multiplying the values by the supply voltage and the current
draw values from appropriate data sheets.
We obtain all the results in this section from measurements
on real hardware. They are averaged over at least 500 hand-
shakes and presented with a 95% confidence interval.
Overall results. Fig. 3 shows the measured average hand-
shake duration and the energy consumption when DTLS
runs on an IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled network, in the
single/multi-hop case, and for different values of BI and CAP.
Impact of BI. Results in the single-hop case (Fig. 3(a))
show how a short BI shortens the handshake as nodes get
more frequent opportunities to transmit. Similarly, a large CAP
gives nodes a long period to communicate; largest evaluated
CAP of 122.9ms yields shortest duration of the handshake.
A larger CAP increases the throughput between two nodes,
which means that a DTLS endpoint (client or server) can send
its messages within the same CAP.
Impact of the number of hops. Fig. 3(b) presents the
measured DTLS handshake duration when DTLS client and
server are separated by multiple hops. As expected, the DTLS
handshake duration increases almost linearly with the number
of hops. For values of BI above 250ms, the successful
completion of a DTLS handshake between client and server
multiple hops away requires the configuration of a large
retransmission timeout value, even when there are no packets
lost in the network. We observe handshake durations from
1.88 s to 16.6 s.
Energy Consumption. Fig. 3(c) shows the energy con-
sumed by an ST GreenNet board running as a DTLS client
during a DTLS handshake. The energy consumption only very
slightly increases with BI, as the energy consumption of a
transmitting node in beacon-enabled mode is not a function
of the wakeup interval. Why the energy increases at all with
BI is a consequence of the energy spent by the nodes when
sitting idle.
C. IEEE 802.15.4e TSCH Networks
External interference and multi-path fading severely degrade
the quality of a wireless link, both in indoor and outdoor
deployments. The IEEE 802.15.4e-2012 standard [10] defines
the Time Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode, which uses
“channel hopping” to combat external interference and multi-
path fading.
In a TSCH network, time is cut into timeslots, each long
enough for a transmitter to send a data packet to a re-
ceiver, and for the receiver to send back an acknowledgment
(ACK) indicating successful reception. L successive timeslots
form a “slotframe”, which continuously repeats over time.
A communication schedule indicates to each node, for each
slot in the slotframe, what to do (transmit, receive or sleep)
and on which channel. The communication schedule can be
built in a centralized or distributed fashion. The scheduler
(either a centralized computer or a distributed protocol) builds
and maintains the schedule in order to match the link-layer
resources (timeslots scheduled between neighbor nodes) to
the applications needs (number of packets per second, latency
requirements). We assume that the scheduler schedules a cell
(a [timeslot, channel] pair) to only a single pair of nodes,
thereby avoiding self-interference in the network.
We derive the expected latency in a TSCH network ana-
lytically, and apply it to DTLS. Let C denote the number
of cells scheduled in a slotframe between two nodes in a
TSCH network. We consider that cells are distributed in the
TSCH schedule in a uniform fashion, i.e. the probability for
a cell to be assigned to the appropriate timeslot is 1/L.
Consider a single-hop communication between two nodes; we
are interested in finding the average latency D that includes
the time a frame spent in a node queue before its transmission
and reception at the destination node.
Let random variable T denote the instant in a slotframe
when a frame has been selected from a node queue for
transmission. We consider T to be uniformly distributed over
the slotframe length. Note that the instant T corresponds
to a frame that is either self-originated, or received from a
neighbor and to be forwarded. Let X0, X1, . . . , XC−1 de-
note random variables that correspond to the interval from
instant T until the beginning of the corresponding cell slot.
The average latency until the beginning of the frame trans-
mission is the expectancy of the random variable Y =
min(X0, X1, ..., XC−1). Since the slotframe repeats in time,
variables X0, X1, . . . , XC−1 are also uniformly distributed on
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Fig. 3. Cost of a DTLS handshake in a beacon-enabled IEEE 802.15.4 network.
TABLE I
SINGLE-HOP DTLS HANDSHAKE DURATION IN A TSCH NETWORK.
C = 1 C = 2 C = 3
L = 101 5.15s 3.467s 2.625s
L = 1001 50.15s 33.467s 25.125s
TABLE II
MULTI-HOP DTLS HANDSHAKE DURATION IN A TSCH NETWORK (C=1).
H = 2 H = 3 H = 4
L = 101 10.3s 15.45s 20.6s
L = 1001 100.3s 150.45s 200.6s
(0, L − 1). Assuming L >> C, the average latency until the
beginning of the frame transmission is L/(C + 1) timeslots.
Eq. (1) expresses the single-hop latency (in timeslots), taking
into account the duration of the timeslot during which the
frame is transmitted, and the Packet Delivery Ratio P over
the link.
Dsinglehop = (1 +
L
C + 1
) · 1
P
(1)
To extend Eq. (1) to the multi-hops case, we take into account
the varying number of cells on each link. Considering a
centralized schedule, the total latency over H intermediate
hops is the sum of individual hop latencies:
Dmultihop =
H∑
i=1
(1 +
L
Ci + 1
) · 1
Pi
(2)
We use Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) to estimate the average duration of
a DTLS handshake for typical TSCH values. We consider the
same scenario as experimentally evaluated in Sections III-A
and III-B (10 link-layer frames carrying DTLS messages) and
a default timeslot duration of 10ms. Tables I and II present
the estimated DTLS handshake duration for typical values of
L and C and ideal Packet Delivery Ratio.
We compared analytical results of TSCH with experimental
results of beacon-enabled mode in order to find scenarios
where they perform similarly. For a slotframe length of 101
timeslots, estimated handshake durations with 1, 2, and 3
dedicated cells in TSCH case, roughly correspond to beacon-
enabled [BI = 983ms, CAP = 61.4ms], [BI = 491.5ms,
CAP = 30.7ms], [BI = 491.5ms, CAP = 61.4ms] configu-
rations, respectively.
IV. THE IMPACT OF MEMORY CONSTRAINTS
We have so far focused on the communication aspects of
DTLS in duty-cycled networks. As the role of a DTLS server
is often assumed by a constrained device, this section focuses
on the effect of memory limitations on DTLS session man-
agement. RFC 7228 [16] defines three classes of constrained
devices: Class 0 ( 10 kB RAM,  100 kB flash), Class 1
(∼ 10 kB RAM, ∼ 100 kB flash), Class 2 (∼ 50 kB RAM,
∼ 250 kB flash). According to this classification, WiSMote
platform is a Class 1 device, while ST GreenNet used in
Section III-B falls in-between Classes 1 and 2.
Because of the way memory is allocated with embedded
processors, a typical implementation statically allocates a
number of DTLS “session slots”, limiting the number of
sessions simultaneously open. The memory footprint for a
single DTLS session depends on the cipher suite and key
length. The session state includes the IPv6 address and a
port number of the communicating peer, its role (i.e. client
or server), DTLS engine state, master secret, derived keys and
other implementation specific variables. As an example, the
tinyDTLS implementation uses ∼ 400B of RAM per pre-
shared key session, depending on the data type sizes used by
different compilers, memory alignment and hardware architec-
ture. That said, the operating system and the networking stack
account for the most of the available memory. For instance,
with 16 kB of RAM available on WiSMote nodes, we could
only fit 3 DTLS session slots together with the full ContikiOS
and the IPv6 networking stack including tinyDTLS, and a
simple application for evaluation purposes.
We therefore want to determine the probability PB that
a DTLS client attempts to establish a session with a DTLS
server where all DTLS session slots are already occupied.
We call R the number of DTLS session slots available at
a server. Let N denote the number of clients interested in
establishing a session with the given server. We model the
individual client rate with the exponential distribution of
parameter λ, and the duration of each established session with
parameter µ. Generated traffic in Erlang by each client is then
ρ = λ/µ. Under these assumptions, the blocking probability
PB of a DTLS server is simply the blocking probability of a
M/M/R/R/N queue, i.e. the Engset loss formula.
For instance, if we consider R = 3 (the case observed
with WiSMote), N = 5 DTLS clients with ρ = 0.5, the
blocking probability of a request is ∼ 17%. A DTLS server
may implement different strategies for handling such requests.
It may discard them or decide to close one of the open
sessions in order to accommodate the newly arriving one. In
the latter case, performance depends on the session closure
policy, i.e. the appropriate “cache” replacement algorithm.
V. RELATED WORK
Performance and applicability of DTLS to constrained en-
vironments has been a controversial issue for the IoT re-
search and standardization communities. Many authors studied
DTLS in this context and proposed different optimization
techniques [6], [7], [17], [4], [18]. Granjal et al. [6] performed
a comparative study on memory footprints, computational
time, and the required energy between the IPsec protocol
and DTLS using different cryptographic suites. They showed
similar performance of IPsec and DTLS, except when DTLS
is additionally used to exchange keys with the Elliptic Curve
Diffie-Hellman exchange.
Hummen et al. [17], [4] proposed different techniques to
lower the impact of the DTLS handshake on constrained
devices, certificate pre-validation at the network gateway and
handshake delegation to the “delegation server”. Raza et al. [7]
focused on reducing the per-datagram overhead and proposed a
6LoWPAN DTLS compression scheme. In our previous work,
we studied the benefits of a stateless security architecture
called OSCAR [5], based on DTLS, in order to support group
communication and caching.
The recent work of Capossele et al. [18] explores the idea
of abstracting the DTLS handshake as a CoAP resource and
implementing the handshake procedure using CoAP methods.
The advantage of this approach is that DTLS can leverage
the reliability of confirmable CoAP messages, as well as
the blockwise transfer for large messages. The drawback,
however, is lost backward compatibility with the existing
Internet infrastructure.
Finally, Kumar et al. [19] summarized DTLS memory
requirements, high level communication overhead (in terms
of number of messages), code size for different DTLS and
cryptographic functions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The results of our thorough evaluation reported in this
paper demonstrate surprisingly poor performance of DTLS
in radio duty-cycled networks. Experiments with preamble
sampling protocols show that the total duration of a DTLS
handshake can be more than 50 s, depending on the Check
Interval. In the case of the IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled
mode, we measure durations up to 35 s with the largest
used Beacon Interval of ∼ 4 s. Handshake duration increases
linearly with the number of hops for both preamble-sampling
and IEEE 802.15.4 beacon-enabled networks. We also derived
the analytic expression for latency in TSCH networks and
applied it to estimate the duration of DTLS handshake. For
instance, in a typical TSCH network with 101 timeslots per
slotframe, where DTLS server and client are radio neighbors
and have a single dedicated cell for communication, it takes
5.5 s on the average to complete the handshake. This value
decreases to 2.6 s for 3 dedicated cells.
Our results show that using DTLS is acceptable for appli-
cations for which a DTLS handshake is performed a limited
number of times during the constrained node lifetime. For
scenarios that require multiple DTLS clients per DTLS server
with constrained resources, we study the blocking probability
and show that it corresponds to the Engset loss formula.
Applications expecting a large number of clients per DTLS
server should cautiously weight the benefit of its use, against
security solutions at the Network or Application layer.
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